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The desire to produce offspring is as old as time. It is, in some instances, 
even considered integral to our identity as human beings. However, the 
reality exists that not everyone who desires offspring is able to reproduce 
naturally. There are those who are forced to resort to assisted reproduction 
to fulfil this desire. For them, the process of becoming parents is often 
not a smooth one. A road paved with a myriad of choices awaits them. 
These include decisions regarding doctors, procedures and possibly 
donors. This process is further complicated by the existence of legislation 
which, instead of providing clarity on the options available to them, has 
the opposite effect. The legislation in question is the National Health Act 
No. 61 of 2003 (NHA, or the Act)[1] and the regulations relating to artificial 
fertilisation of persons (‘the regulations’)[2] promulgated under the NHA. 
This Act has been characterised as ‘flawed law’,[3] and the regulations are 
no different. What makes matters worse is the fact that some acts are 
reliant on these regulations in order to give them content. What follows 
is therefore an analysis of the NHA, the regulations and the Children’s 
Act No. 38 of 2005,[4] the aim of which is to identify flaws and to provide 
suggestions for remedying potential defects, in order to produce 
legislation that not only creates legal certainty, but which is up to date and 
on par with advances in science and technology.
The NHA
The NHA was promulgated as a replacement for ‘the last vestige of 
apartheid in health policy’. It:
 ‘provides a framework for a structured and uniform health 
system under which the various elements of the South African 
(SA) national health system may be united in the common goal 
of improving universal access to quality health’.[5]
The Act, consisting of 12 chapters, relies heavily on regulations to 
supplement its provisions. Chapter 8 alone has produced no less than 
14 regulations[3] since it first entered into force on 1 March 2012. The 
reason for this is attributed to the fact that the NHA is: 
 ‘framework legislation. This means that it sets out broad legal and 
operational principles that must be fleshed out in regulations’.[5]
While this may be true, what is alarming is the fact that the numerous 
regulations were promulgated within a relatively short period of 5 
years, which is both excessive and unacceptable.[3] This ‘proverbial 
flooding of the legislative plain’ is indicative of the fact that chapter 8 
is ‘fatally flawed’.[3] It is further:
 ‘outdated and lags behind scientific development and progress, 
… contains factual errors, creates lacunae and hands the minister 
of health excessive authority and power’.[3]
The first flaw identified can be found in section 55. This section, titled 
the ‘removal of tissue, blood, blood products or gametes from living 
persons’ states that ‘[a] person may not remove … gametes from the 
body of another living person’. It is interesting to note that while this 
provision requires consent from the donor, it limits the removal of 
gametes to living persons only. The challenge posed by this provision 
and the flaw inherent herein is discussed with reference to section 56.
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Section 56 provides that tissue, blood, blood products or gametes 
removed or withdrawn from living persons may only be used for 
such medical and dental purposes as may be prescribed. Artificial 
fertilisation is presumably a prescribed medical purpose. This 
assumption is drawn from the existence of an entire set of regulations 
dedicated to artificial fertilisation. Given the fact that it is medically 
possible to remove or withdraw tissue, blood, blood products 
or gametes from both the living and the dead (within certain 
time frames), it is interesting that section 55 limits the removal of 
gametes to the living. It is in this respect that chapter 8 of the NHA 
is ‘outdated and lags behind scientific development and progress’.[3] 
Evidence of this can be found in developments pertaining to assisted 
reproduction. Katz,[6] for example, observes that: 
 ‘[f ]or over 30 years it has been possible to retrieve sperm from 
males who are deceased, brain dead, comatose or in a persistent 
vegetative state for use in procreation by the recipient’.[6] 
In fact, the first reported case of posthumous sperm retrieval occurred 
in 1980, which is more than 20 years prior to the promulgation of 
the NHA. That it is still not permitted under the NHA either confirms 
that the Act is outdated, in comparison with countries such as Israel, 
Belgium and the UK, where posthumous reproduction is allowed, or 
alternatively, it suggests that there are other reasons for ignoring the 
possibilities offered by these scientific developments.
Another criticism levelled against this section pertains to the 
ministerial authorisation for the removal or withdrawal of tissue, 
blood, a blood product or gametes. The problem with this provision 
is that: 
 ‘ministerial approval is not ideal as the minister, or the delegated 
person acting on his or her behalf, often lacks the necessary 
knowledge regarding [assisted reproduction and assisted 
reproductive technologies to make an informed decision]. 
This may inhibit decision-making and ultimately has negative 
repercussions on the development of this branch of science in 
South Africa.’[3] 
It has been suggested, within the context of stem-cell research, 
that an independent body or specialist regulatory board be 
established to deal with such matters.[3] This recommendation 
applies equally to assisted reproduction and developments 
involving assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). An 
independent body would be beneficial as this body could 
objectively assess which new developments within ART should be 
permitted, without undue influence from any entity with a vested 
interest in the outcome. Furthermore, all legislation involving 
technical areas such as ART should not be drafted exclusively by 
legal ‘experts’. The obvious lack of understanding displayed in the 
existing legislation suggests that medical expertise is a necessity 
in legislation of this nature, something which is clearly lacking. It 
has been suggested that:
 ‘[t]he importance of interdisciplinary co-operation in the 
drafting, interpretation and implementation of legislation in 
this area cannot be overemphasised’.[7]
Section 57 serves as a prohibition on reproductive cloning. This term 
is defined in section 57(6)(a) as: 
 ‘the manipulation of genetic material in order to achieve 
the reproduction of a human being and includes nuclear 
transfer or embryo splitting for such purpose’.
The problem posed by this provision is that other forms of genetic 
manipulation have developed that are not performed for the purpose 
of reproductive cloning. Mitochondrial donation or transfer is one 
such development. This treatment allows for the removal of DNA 
‘from a patient’s egg or embryo containing unhealthy mitochondria 
to a donor’s egg or embryo containing healthy mitochondria’.[8] 
Based on the definition provided, there is a degree of manipulation 
of the genetic material, as well as activity involving nuclear transfer. 
Such activity is ostensibly a violation of section 57. Bredenoord et 
al.,[9] however, disagree. They are of the opinion that a transfer of 
mitochondria does not produce genetically identical offspring. 
As such, mitochondrial transfer does not constitute reproductive 
cloning[9] and should therefore be permitted.
What is evident from the current framing of section 57 is that it 
leaves unanswered the status of newer developments involving 
assisted reproduction. In this respect, the legislator would do well 
to amend the provision to provide clarity on the status of genetic 
manipulation conducted for reproductive, non-cloning purposes. 
Such an amendment could specifically define and identify permissible 
forms of genetic manipulation conducted for reproductive, non-
cloning purposes.
Section 62(1)(a)(iii) of the NHA states that:
 ‘a person who is competent to make a will may ... donate his or 
her body or any specified tissue thereof to be used after his or 
her death’. 
While this provision could have been interpreted as allowing 
posthumous gamete retrieval and subsequent reproduction, this 
possibility is quashed by the definition in the act that defines tissue as 
‘human tissue … [which] excludes blood or a gamete’. This particular 
provision therefore puts paid to the possibility of posthumous 
reproduction.
The regulations
Considering that:
 ‘the Act is flawed [a] person would thus wish to see these flaws 
addressed in the numerous regulations made in terms of the 
NHA. This is, however, not the case as the regulations have, 
rather than [clarified] some of the ambiguities and solved some 
of the issues, caused even further complications.’[3]
This is sadly the case regarding the regulations relating to the artificial 
fertilisation of persons, despite the fact that these regulations have 
recently been amended. A number of flaws have been identified, 
which raises some concern for the use of assisted reproduction. 
The first apparent flaw can be found in the title. The use of the term 
‘artificial’ suggests that the process is an unnatural one. For individuals 
who pursue this option, it may be a last resort – and often a painful and 
difficult one, which should not be laden with negative connotations 
in the terminology used. It is suggested that the title be amended 
to the ‘regulations relating to the assisted reproduction of persons’. 
A revision would clearly indicate the purpose for which these forms 
of ART are used. The term ‘assisted’ is also broad enough to include 
newer technologies that do not involve fertilisation but which are still 
integral to reproduction.
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The second set of flaws lies in the definition section. This section 
defines artificial fertilisation as ‘the introduction by other than natural 
means’. Once again, this is a value judgement from persons who may 
not have grappled with infertility[10,11] or subfertility.[12] 
Additional definitions that are a cause of concern include 
‘deceased’. This term is not used anywhere in the regulations, except 
in the definition section. Furthermore, the NHA defines ‘death’ as 
being brain dead. In contrast, the regulations define ‘deceased’ as 
meaning ‘somatic death’. While these terms mean the same thing, it 
is interesting to note that the regulations on more than one occasion 
opt for a more complex definition that does nothing in the way of 
providing clarity or understanding. 
Furthermore, in the definition of gamete donor, reference is made 
only to living persons. This once again suggests that a gamete donor 
may not be a deceased person, regardless of whether consent has 
been obtained or not. The option of posthumous reproduction is thus 
ostensibly excluded.
The third flaw pertains to section 2 of the regulations, which 
unequivocally links the regulations to the withdrawal of gametes 
from living persons. The existence of this provision suggests that 
gametes may not be retrieved from deceased persons. Sadly, the 
exclusion of posthumous gamete retrieval (regardless of whether 
consent was given prior to death) means that for some individuals 
(such as a spouse who desires offspring that are biologically related 
to the deceased), this may represent a lost opportunity to reproduce 
entirely.
Section 13 deals with pre-implantation and prenatal testing for sex 
selection. This provision indicates that this procedure is prohibited 
(except in clearly defined instances), but is silent on the issue of 
whether it is permitted in other instances such as pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), for the purpose of creating saviour siblings. 
However, this is potentially covered in the regulations regarding 
the use of human DNA, RNA, cultured cells, stem cells, blastomeres, 
polar bodies, embryos, embryonic tissue and small-tissue biopsies 
for diagnostic testing, health research and therapeutics.[13] What 
is interesting to note is that while these regulations relate to 
diagnostic testing, the creation of saviour siblings involves ‘artificial 
fertilisation’,[13] and is performed for the purpose of reproduction. The 
issue of PGD should as such be covered in the regulations, if only to 
advise prospective users of ‘artificial fertilisation’ that this option is 
not permitted by law.
Section 17 of the regulations deals with those instances where it 
comes to the attention of the parents that a child born as a result 
of ART suffers from an illness or defect. Presumably this provision 
relates to those instances where donor gametes have been used. This 
provision states that these defects or illnesses must be brought to the 
attention of the institution that effected the artificial fertilisation. The 
purpose of this notification is unclear. It raises the important question 
of whether liability will ensue and if so, who will be held liable: 
the institution or the donor? While the institution may be covered 
against financial claims of this nature, the possibility of delictual or 
contractual damages against donors may impact on the use of ART 
to facilitate reproduction.
Section 18 deals with the issue of the ownership of gametes, 
zygotes and embryos. This provision states that ownership of a 
zygote or embryo, after fertilisation has occurred, vests in the 
recipient regardless of whether the donor is male or female. The 
challenge posed by this provision is that a zygote or embryo is the 
genetic product of two individuals. It is thus unclear whether the 
recipient is the male donor or female donor. Furthermore, in instances 
where zygotes or embryos have been cryopreserved and there is no 
identified recipient, in other words, where the genetic parents are 
uncertain whether they will use the zygote or embryo themselves, 
who does ownership belong to? The regulations on this score are 
unclear, and there is definitely room for legislative reform. While the 
regulations state that embryos will be discarded if a period of 10 years 
has passed and the embryos have not been claimed, the situation 
regarding the ownership of embryos where there is a dispute 
between the parties is similarly unclear. 
Clearly the regulations are as perplexing as chapter 8 of the NHA is 
‘confusing and incomplete’.[14] 
That said, the 2016 regulations are an improvement on the 2012 
regulations[15] in at least two respects. Firstly, the term ‘surrogacy’, as 
defined in the 2012 regulations, has been omitted. The definition of 
this term had served as a source of confusion, as it did not appear to 
contemplate traditional or partial surrogacy. This was inconsistent 
with the Children’s Act, which provides for full or gestational as well as 
traditional or partial surrogacy. The definition was further problematic 
as it referred to ‘contractual parents’, which was a deviation from the 
‘commissioning parents’ referred to in the Children’s Act. What is 
interesting to note in this regard is that the 2012 regulations were 
drafted after the Children’s Act was promulgated, and yet this 
appeared to have been done in isolation and without any regard for 
the legislation that would impact on them.
Secondly, section 6 of the 2012 regulations was a flawed and 
outdated provision. This section restricted the donation of gametes 
to a maximum of six children being conceived using the same 
gamete donor. The problem with this limitation was twofold. Firstly, 
there is a difference between the conception of six children, and 
six live births.[16] If the intention of the legislator was the latter 
as opposed to the former, then this intention was not relayed in 
the wording of section 6. Secondly, the number six was arbitrary 
and inconsistent with international trends.[16] The UK, for example, 
currently limits the use of donor gametes to 10 live births, while the 
Netherlands limits their use to 25.[16] In both these instances, the 
number arrived at was the result of country-specific population data.[16] 
Fortunately, this provision has since been replaced by section 7 of the 
2016 regulations, which restricts the donation of gametes to 12 live 
births, and even permits this number to be exceeded to allow a family 
to have an additional child from the same donor. This is a marked 
improvement on the previous position.
Despite the improvements listed above, the incompatibility 
between the NHA and the regulations does not end there. The 
Children’s Act refers to certain forms of assisted reproduction in 
its provisions, which further highlights the lack of compatibility 
mentioned above.
The Children’s Act
As the Children’s Act was promulgated after the NHA and before the 
regulations entered into force, one would expect that the Children’s 
Act would complement the NHA or that the regulations would 
complement the Children’s Act. While this is seemingly the case 
with all the provisions dealing with assisted reproduction, namely 
sections 40 and 41 of the Children’s Act, which relate to children 
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conceived by artificial fertilisation, and chapter 19, which deals with 
surrogacy, it is not the case as far as the definitions are concerned. For 
example, artificial fertilisation is defined differently in the Children’s 
Act than it is in the regulations. In the Children’s Act, the emphasis 
is more on the way in which reproduction can occur than it is on the 
procedures by which it can occur. In addition, the term ‘surrogate’ 
in the Children’s Act is wide enough to accommodate both full and 
partial surrogacy, which was not the case in the definition provided 
for in the 2012 regulations. As mentioned, the now-removed 
definition of surrogate  referred to ‘contracting parents’. This was 
inconsistent with the preferred term of ‘commissioning parents’ in 
the Children’s Act. Interestingly, the 2016 regulations omit the term 
entirely. This is worrying, as the NHA makes no reference to the term, 
and surrogacy involves artificial fertilisation. At the very least, this 
term should have been included in the 2016 regulations, although 
in an amended form.
While these inconsistencies are not fatal as far as assisted 
reproduction is concerned, they do suggest an incompatibility in 
the existing legislative framework, one which has the potential to 
frustrate those who engage in this form of reproduction.
Recommendations
One of the challenges posed by assisted reproduction or the use of 
ART is the issue of how best to regulate it. In some instances, countries 
such as the UK have a system of regulation in place that attempts to 
address all concerns involving the use of ART.[17] In contrast, countries 
such as the USA adopt a very different approach, where there is 
minimal federal legislation.[17] Instead, there is a heavy reliance on 
guidelines that serve as guideposts for matters pertaining to ART. 
SA appears to be midway between these two extremes, and yet the 
legislation that exists is not comprehensive enough to adequately 
address the concerns raised, or to deal with newer developments in 
this field. What is therefore needed is a review of all legislation dealing 
with ART. The purpose of this would be to create comprehensive 
legislation that adequately governs this area. A model similar to that 
adopted by Canada is proposed. While the Canadian Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act of 2004 was struck down by the Supreme Court of 
Canada for ‘invading provincial jurisdiction’,[18] there is much that can 
be learnt from this model. One of the striking features of the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act was the fact that it ‘addressed five of six 
major areas that constitute the typical policy space with respect to 
ARTs’.[18] These included embryonic research, reproductive cloning, 
assisted conception, surrogacy and offspring engineering. The only 
area omitted relates to the parentage policy, an area that is included 
in the UK’s ART legislation.[19]
The second recommendation relates to the creation of an 
independent regulatory body, similar to the UK’s Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority, which would have oversight over matters 
related to ART, and in particular, new technological advancements.
These two changes alone would go a long way toward creating 
legal certainty for those engaged in assisted reproduction, and 
toward ensuring that SA stays abreast of developments in the field.
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